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Should Slavery’s Statues Be Preserved? On Transitional
Justice and Contested Heritage
JOANNA BURCH-BROWN
ABSTRACT What should we do with statues and place-names memorializing people who
committed human-rights abuses linked to slavery and postslavery racism? In this article, I
draw on UN principles of transitional justice to address this question. I propose that a success-
ful approach should meet principles of transitional justice recognized by the United Nations,
including affirming rights to justice, truth, reparations, and guarantees of nonrecurrence of
human rights violations. I discuss four strategies for handling contested heritage, examining
strengths and weaknesses of each strategy. Examples from Bristol, England, highlight common
challenges and positive lessons.
Introduction
Do principles of transitional justice imply that we should take down statues and
rename places called after people who participated in serious rights abuses associated
with white supremacy? Or do they imply that we should keep such elements of con-
tested heritage in place, as part of truth telling and acknowledgement, and as pedagog-
ical tools for vividly teaching the history in question, to support the aims of
nonrecurrence?
I analyse the options of preserving, removing, recontextualizing, and reclaiming
objects like Confederate statues or place-names. I draw out strengths and weaknesses
of each strategy, looking at ways in which these strategies may succeed or fail to
uphold four key rights as recognized in UN guidance on transitional justice – namely
rights of justice, truth, reparation and guarantees of nonrecurrence. I argue that
preservation, removal, and recontextualizing can each be consistent with transitional
justice, if carried out well in the right circumstances. However, a great deal depends
on how the strategies are enacted. I close by suggesting that many successful responses
involve some form of symbolic reconfigurations or reclaiming, very broadly conceived,
so that locations of current or former celebratory iconography become reparative sites
of memory. The best forms of reclaiming can build pride, identity, agency, and com-
mitment to repairing injustices.
This article makes an original, rigorous, and significant contribution to a debate of
wide-reaching public interest. It is one of the first articles in any discipline to systemat-
ically link debates over Confederate statues and colonial iconography, to UN guidance
on transitional justice.1 Midway through the UN’s International Decade for People of
African Descent, and at a time when public conversations about reparations for slavery
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are growing stronger in the United States, the Caribbean, and Britain,2 linking these
debates to transitional justice is both timely and important.
This article contributes to applied philosophical study of transitional justice, inter-
preted broadly as the study of what justice requires of societies coming to terms with a
violent past.3 This interdisciplinary field includes work from political and legal philos-
ophy, but my focus is the social philosophy of transitional justice. Social philosophy
refers to the normative study of social behaviour. This article focuses on social philos-
ophy related to collective memory and heritage, contributing to a nascent literature on
transitional justice related to colonialism, slavery, and postslavery racism.4 The analy-
sis should be of interest to social and political philosophers, and to scholars studying
slavery, colonialism, and decolonization; ‘race’ and racism; heritage and public mem-
ory; epistemic injustice; conflict and peace building; prejudice and intergroup rela-
tions, and related topics.
Methodologically, this article is an example of action-based philosophical research,
reflecting my involvement from 2016 to 2020 with contested heritage debates in Bris-
tol, England. Colston Hall’s 2017 vote to change its name was the first decision of its
kind by a major institution in the United Kingdom, and by my estimates at least two
dozen Bristol institutions have since taken steps to acknowledge Bristol’s history or
rebalance colonial iconography.5 While lessons cannot be transported uncritically,
scholars of memory have often observed common dynamics across diverse contexts of
difficult heritage.6 Both the examples and the wider argument will be informative for
scholars and practitioners addressing contested heritage across diverse contexts.
Transitional justice depends on local and regional contexts. Many societies face
conflicts over heritage and public symbols following recent mass human-rights abuses,
with limited regime change and persistent ethos of conflict.7 Rwanda, Uganda,
the Balkans, Chile, South Africa, Ireland, and Cambodia are examples of countries
whose debates over symbols in public space reflect recent intergroup conflicts. The
stakes are higher and intergroup dynamics more volatile, in a community with tenuous
peace, recent armed conflict, few ties between social groups, weak rule of law, corrupt
governance largely continuous with an abusive former regime, and so on.8 I do not
attempt to address such cases, although scholars of peace building will be able to
adapt the method of argument and will recognize many dynamics discussed here.
I begin by introducing evidence on public attitudes towards Confederate statues and
by arguing that strategies for handling contested heritage should accord with UN
guidelines on transitional justice. I then look in turn at the four strategies of preserv-
ing, removing, recontextualizing, and reclaiming. In each case, I start by highlighting
what the strategy might achieve in its best forms before turning to counterarguments
and challenges that may prevent the strategy from achieving its positive purposes.
Readers should come away with an expanded sense of positive possibilities and options
for communities grappling with contested heritage, as well as a more informed, realis-
tic understanding of likely challenges.
Contested heritage and transitional justice
A 2019 report by the Southern Poverty Law Centre found that 114 Confederate sym-
bols that have been removed since the Charleston massacre of 2015. The report
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mapped more than 1,747 Confederate symbols remaining across the United States,
including monuments, place-names, and state holidays.9 Most were raised in early
1900’s, with a spike in the Civil Rights Era, suggesting that an aim of these memorials
was to bolster Jim Crow and protect white supremacy.10 Attitudes towards Confeder-
ate memorials are divided along racial lines, and poll results are sensitive to wording.
As of 2017, 54% of Americans said that it is wrong to take down Confederate monu-
ments, which many argue should remain part of the country’s heritage.11 A more
recent Winthrop Poll found that a majority of Southern Blacks (62%) preferred an
action stronger than just adding a historical marker for segregationist leaders, with the
most popular option being to move statues of segregationist leaders to museums. Only
one third of whites shared this view, with two-thirds preferring to instead either add a
plaque or leave the statues unaltered.12
The debates over statues and place-names can be seen as part of movements for
transitional justice.13 The central question of transitional justice is ‘How should a soci-
ety come to terms with a violent past?’14 The United Nations defines transitional jus-
tice as ‘the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt
to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure account-
ability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation’.15 In its guidance on transitional jus-
tice, the United Nations enjoins communities to seek peace, reconciliation, and justice
as mutually supporting aims, and it enshrines four key rights to (1) justice, (2) truth,
(3) symbolic and material reparations, and (4) guarantees of nonrecurrence.16 The
meaning of these terms is worked out through a mixture of theory and practice.
Common components of transitional justice in practice include the following: prose-
cution initiatives; truth seeking to map and document serious violations; material repa-
rations via compensation, development aid or social investment; symbolic reparations
such as museums, memorials and commemorations; institutional reform to prevent
future abuses; and measures to encourage public engagement in the process of transi-
tion towards justice and reconciliation.
Starting from the UN guidelines anchors the discussion in expressed commitments
of the international community. The United Nations 2004 guidelines have been a
touchstone for much subsequent work on transitional justice.17 Moreover, the rights
identified have parallels in every major account of transitional justice. The UN guideli-
nes therefore provide a valuable starting point for analysis.
It could be objected that the UN guidelines are philosophically thin, and the con-
cepts of justice, truth, repair, and guarantees of nonrecurrence are each ambiguous.18
For instance, in the context of transitional justice, the right to ‘justice’ is often inter-
preted in retributive terms, as a right to see perpetrators of wrongdoing held account-
able.19 However, accountability for mass and normalized wrongdoing raises distinctive
problems.20 Where wrongdoing is normalized, it is often unclear how culpability
should be apportioned to individuals. Moreover, calls for accountability often presume
that seeing wrongdoers held accountable has therapeutic benefits for victims; that it is
an important precondition for reconciliation; and that it is a morally justified response
to wrongdoing in general. These assumptions can all be questioned.21 Furthermore, it
is unclear what forms of accountability can be achieved, or are desirable, for injustices
that occurred multiple generations in the past.22 The putative right to justice evidently
raises important philosophical questions.
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The right to truth is likewise ambiguous. Memory is selective, and it is neither possi-
ble nor desirable to create a complete historical record.23 What does it mean for the cri-
terion of ‘truth’ to be met in just transition? While some see remembering as essential
for healing, others argue that healing depends on forgetting. Still others hold that what
healing requires is not just the truths of history but truths of poetry, or truth-telling at a
deeper level than surface facts.
As these comments suggest, each putative right is open to interpretation. An alterna-
tive would be to start from a thicker philosophical account of transitional justice.
Excellent philosophical work has been done,24 but every philosophical account of tran-
sitional justice is controversial,25 and none has the influence and reach of the UN
guidelines. Moreover, despite philosophical and evidential questions, communities can
and do use these guidelines alongside exemplars and practical judgement to arrive at
good expressions of each of the rights. I take it as a reasonable presumption that just
transitions include some appropriate forms of accountability, acknowledgement, repair
of ongoing harmful legacies, and reform to protect against future human-rights viola-
tions.
The specific features of Atlantic world slavery and postslavery racism make some
aspects of transitional justice irrelevant or unattainable. For instance, it is impossible
to now hold to account the individuals and informal networks who wrote slavery into
law or who committed human-rights abuses under slavery-supporting laws. However,
these and other complicating factors do not show that there are no contemporary
responsibilities of repair associated with historic injustices of slavery and postslavery
racism. Instead, they have implications for the kinds of repair that can be taken. In the
2001 Durban Declaration, the United Nations recognized the slave trade and transat-
lantic slavery as a crime against humanity. It also acknowledged a right for people of
African descent to seek reparations for the history of human-rights abuses associated
with transatlantic slavery, colonialism, and postslavery racism. The decade beginning
2015 was declared the UN Decade for People of African Descent, and amongst its
central aims is to move towards greater justice in how communities handle the legacies
of these histories.
Should We Preserve, Remove, Recontextualize, or Reclaim Contested
Objects?
Preserving without alteration
According to widely accepted values, historic features of the built environment are
shared heritage and should be preserved for future generations. The cultural heritage
sector itself tends towards preserving heritage in its original form.26 This long-standing
orientation has been reasserted in many settings in response to recent calls to remove
dissonant heritage. In the United States, numerous states have introduced laws against
altering or removing monuments, including Alabama (2017), Mississippi (2004),
North Carolina (2015), South Carolina (2000), and Tennessee (2016).27 The US
National Trust for Historic Preservation offers a point of contrast, having stated: ‘We
should always remember the past, but do not necessarily need to revere it’.28 How-
ever, preservationism remains the dominant outlook of the sector.
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Preserving historic statues and place-names can serve a number of positive aims.
Different historical eras produce layers of artefacts, and these accretions create a sense
of historical developments, of distance travelled and changes over time.29 Keeping his-
torical artefacts in place can provide new generations with a window into the past. It is
possible to reject the idea that heritage necessarily has a positive valence, instead con-
ceptualizing heritage as the part of the past we regard as our own, in all its complex-
ity.30 Preserving statues might in some cases keep this historical complexity in view.
Moreover, the meanings of artefacts are not fixed by their makers’ original intent but
instead are interpreted in their evolving cultural contexts. James Osborne argues that
although statues are often raised with the aim of solidifying and legitimizing a particu-
lar worldview, these aims are fragile because the statues paradoxically provide a focal
point for critique.31 If that is true, then preserving statues may potentially serve aims
of accountability by keeping their figures in view of a public that has since come to
view their actions critically. It may serve aims of truth, if the dissonance between con-
temporary values and historical ones leads people to enquire critically into the many
sides of the history. It may serve aims of repair if these processes help to motivate
symbolic and material reparative actions. For instance, people may feel that the promi-
nence of slavery’s problematic past in their landscape gives them a personal stake and
a standing from which to take responsibility for repair. A public who is well educated
about the history should experience a sense of tension between the community’s his-
toric expressions of honour towards major human-rights abusers and its expressed
core values like equality, justice, and freedom. Such dissonance can be educative and
motivating. It may vivify an important lesson about how mistaken a society’s norms
can be, motivating critical thinking and inspiring people to be ‘upstanders’ instead of
bystanders.
However, preserving monuments without plaques or critical interpretation can easily
feed into patterns of obscuring and downplaying injustices. The normative problems
for preservation are greatest when parts of a society are attached to a glorified view of
its history and maintain racist or socially hierarchical attitudes that derogate descen-
dants of the group who were victimized by the historic wrongdoing in question. Pre-
serving the commemorations of a racist era can be seen as legitimizing these
problematic views, in the same way that failing to speak up against racist or hateful
speech can have the effect of authorizing it.32
Thus, simple preservation will often be in tension with transitional justice. Preserv-
ing problematic monuments without critical interpretation sends an ambiguous mes-
sage about a community’s commitments to justice and accountability. Removing
honours from human rights violators is one of the few forms of corrective justice avail-
able when a rights violator is dead.33 Demonstrating commitment to accountability
can be important for restoring the status of those harmed by human-rights abuses his-
toric and present.
Second, uncritical preservation stands in tension with rights to truth. Commemora-
tions usually honour a community’s ‘great and good’. These conventions are wide-
spread and expressively fitting.34 Maintaining historically honorific statues may be in
tension with truth-telling requirements if it has the effect of minimizing or downplay-
ing the seriousness of an injustice.35
Third, preservation can stand in tension with duties of symbolic repair. Objects like
Confederate statues can reasonably be read as expressing disregard for those harmed
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by the community’s historic injustice. Mere preservation sends an ambiguous message.
A better strategy will be one that decisively reaffirms the dignity of a derogated group.
Fourth, uncritical preservation can symbolize disregard for the lives of a derogated
group, thus providing little reassurance to victims of ongoing racism that their rights
will be protected.36 Lyricist Andre Dallas writes, ‘When you give him a statue, you
give him a clap. Don’t black lives matter more than a criminal’s cash?’37 The more
frequently people experience attitudinal and behavioural racism in everyday life, the
more likely it is that colonial iconography will be seen as reinforcing wider social mes-
sages of disregard. Chelsey Carter argues that Confederate statues add to the stress
experienced by people already enduring racial insults and that this has physical as well
as emotional consequences.38 Likewise, Travis Timmerman argues that Confederate
statues cause unavoidable and undeserved harm. Specifically, they cause harm to peo-
ple who suffer from being regularly primed to think of the racist motivations behind
the monuments. Timmerman argues that this provides a strong moral reason to
remove Confederate statues.39
There are important counterarguments to the above. One might argue that the
injustices in question are in the distant past and thus no longer require redress. One
might also argue that justice and accountability are complicated in the case of wide-
spread moral ignorance or that it is an injustice to individuals to hold them personally
to account for injustices that they understood to be legal. The idea that cultural igno-
rance excuses wrongdoing is widely though not universally shared.40 Transitional jus-
tice supports rights to accountability, but justice is only served by fair and appropriate
accountability, not by scapegoating.
Another argument is that long-term movement towards peace and justice requires
compromise on all sides and that statues generate social tension with little benefit.41
Writing on transitional justice in general, Makau W. Mutua says:
[I]n order to move forward to an inclusive and fair society, no major party
can be left behind. Those who have been aggrieved must find justice in order
to let go of the hatreds of the past. But equally important is the place of the
perpetrators of the abusive past in the future of the society. While justice
needs to be done, deep concessions must be made by each in order to move
forward to a shared and common future.42
However, these arguments do not show that historic commemorations should be pre-
served without alteration. Preserving conventional honours may do too little to reaf-
firm the dignity of victims and their symbolic descendants and can generate tension
instead of resolving it. Even when moral responsibility is limited, grave injustices can
require repair.43 The fact that the injustices of Atlantic world slavery occurred in the
distant past does not remove requirements of redress. Verene Shepherd demonstrates
vividly the contemporary salience of racialized slavery and apartheid, arguing that these
traumas have been passed on intergenerationally.44 Daniel Butt argues that failure to
carry out reparations early may allow harms to cascade and amplify over time; thus
the passage of time may increase the scale of repair required.45
Shawn Sobers argues that when institutions are perceived as obscuring difficult his-
tory, this leads to distrust and tension between communities.46 He recounts bringing a
group of African heritage students to the English National Trust’s Clevedon Court.
The tour guide mentioned nothing about the property’s substantial links to slavery,
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and afterwards students generated their own explanations for this silence. One student
guessed, inaccurately, that enslaved people were kept in a cellar.
Very quickly other young voices agreed with her, and assumption, conjecture
and myths filled the vacuum in the absence of acknowledgement and facts. . .
The young people demonstrated how naturally inquisitive, but already dis-
trustful minds, can collectively build a social vocabulary to try and make
sense of gaps in historical contexts. They knew they were not entirely com-
fortable or supported in that process, mindful they were not being told the
whole truth.
Lack of forthright acknowledgment generates distrust and undermines values that
preservationists often cite as high priorities, such as value of unity and social cohesion.
This suggests that preserving problematic heritage without critical interpretation will
often be inconsistent with transitional justice.
Removing
If preserving monuments and place-names unaltered is problematic, one alternative is
to remove them. Removing a monument or renaming a building is a historical
moment in itself, which can make a lasting impression in public memory and become
part of both written and oral records of events. In their best enactments, removals can
mark a moment when a community made a decisive stance to acknowledge past
wrongdoing, distance itself from the rationales that justified that wrongdoing, and reaf-
firm shared commitment to universal human rights and equality. These moments and
the debates building up to them are potentially powerful pedagogical opportunities.
They attract intense public attention and thus open a window in which it is possible to
reeducate a public about the historical record and also set a direction for future val-
ues.
Ideally, as exemplified in Mitch Landrieu’s speech marking the removal of Confed-
erate statues from New Orleans in April 2017, these events involve (1) forthright
acknowledgment, apology, repudiation, or condemnation of the wrongdoing; (2) non-
vindictive, accessible explanations of the history and its significance; and (3) reaffirma-
tion of core public values of equality, universal respect, joy, and togetherness.47 In
their best forms, the overall effect can support healing, providing a sense of psycholog-
ical resolution through acknowledgment, and reaffirming dignity and moral protection
of the whole community.
Removals can take place in very different ways. They can take place through well-
structured, consultative processes, as in the example of Colston Primary School in
Bristol, whose three-month school-wide consultation brought in experts to present
diverse views and resulted in renaming as Cotham Gardens Primary School. Removals
can also result from institutional leadership without wider consultation, as in the case
of Bristol Music Trust’s controversial, unanimous vote in 2017 to rename concert
venue Colston Hall, which ultimately became the Bristol Beacon. Their decision
prompted hundreds of letters in opposition in the Bristol Post,48 but it galvanized the
city into action, with at least 20 other institutions taking new steps between April
2017 and June 2020 to address memorialization or contemporary race equality
issues.49 Removals can also take place through direct action or civil disobedience,
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understood as breach of law in order to communicate a message and bring about legal
and social change. When Black Lives Matter demonstrators toppled Colston’s statue
and dropped it in Bristol Harbour in June 2020, national and global response was
immediate. Labour announced that all Labour councils would review their public sym-
bols, as did London and Manchester. Colston’s fall animated conversations not just
about public symbols but also about structural injustices and captured global atten-
tion. At George Floyd’s memorial service, Reverend Al Sharpton cited Bristol as
reflecting the multiethnic nature of current campaigns for racial justice, saying ‘All
over the globe I have seen grandchildren of slavemasters tear down the slavemaster’s
statue, over in England, and put it in the river’. Sharpton’s implication that all white
people are grandchildren of slavemasters is problematic, but the example highlights
how removals can become globally significant moments of symbolic power.
Opponents sometimes see removal as motivated by contempt or other vicious atti-
tudes. Macalester Bell has given a distinctive version of this argument.50 Bell says that
we should express contempt for racist figures, and that removal fails to express con-
tempt effectively, because it lets figures off the hook by removing them from public
critique. She advocates actions like art interventions that dishonour or show contempt
for the figures depicted in the statues. I disagree both with the idea that removal
should express contempt, and with the idea that contempt is the right attitude to fos-
ter. As Landrieu’s speech exemplifies, it is possible to remove statues and rename
places in a way that rebalances public symbolism, condemns and acknowledges wrong-
doing, and at the same time foregrounds values of universal love, peace, dignity, and
respect.
In practice, of course, a wide range of attitudes and values can be found in cam-
paigns for removal, and not all removals culminate in moments like those described
above. Advocates of removal may adopt fundamentalist and simplistic attitudes and
may be severe or aggressive in attacking opponents. There is likely to be a diverse
ecology of views and approaches. However, the fact that some speech in these debates
may be barbed does not imply it should be dismissed, a point that applies on all sides
of the debate.51
On the other hand, there are important arguments against removal as a strategy for
transitional justice. One problem is that calls for removal sometimes do reflect a move
towards fundamentalist, purist attitudes and can be harsh and punitive, potentially
raising concerns about the ethics of what Linda Radzik calls ‘social punishment’.52 It
is important to note that removal need not reflect these attitudes; it is possible to hold
that we owe all people fundamental respect and basic good will and still believe that
our public symbols should be radically changed. Nevertheless, the symbolism of
removal can be easily interpreted as contemptuous. Removal can also be read as evi-
dence that institutions are attempting to ‘erase history’ and hide evidence of past
wrongdoing, instead of addressing it forthrightly. It may also appear to scapegoat indi-
viduals for collective wrongdoing or hold figures to unreasonable standards given the
social milieu in which they lived. Publicly expressive actions must be carried out in a
way attuned to possible misinterpretation, since the social meaning of an action
depends not just on intended meaning but on reception. People have temperamental
differences in tolerance for complexity and ambiguity and different abilities to inte-
grate complex messages. When institutions do not communicate fully, clearly, and
attractively about these actions, a public can easily get the impression that they acting
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on extreme principles, are whitewashing history, or are attempting to evade atten-
tion.53 This means that removals may hinder goals of reconciliation if not supported
by outstanding public communication.
Relatedly, removal may be interpreted as evidence that multiculturalism is a zero-
sum game, and even as confirming right-wing fears that there is a movement to dis-
place white people and white cultural heritage.54 If statues are perceived as represent-
ing larger groups, then removing statues may be read as attacks on the positive
identity of those larger groups and a declaration of hostility. Thus the strategy of
removal may play into racist rhetoric. This may be true even if individual campaigners
attempt to transcend race-based ways of framing the issues.55 Following Stephen Law-
rence’s murder in London (1993), research showed that ‘removal’ narratives were
common and were frequently rehearsed to galvanize racism.56 White youths in these
neighbourhoods widely complained that ‘everybody else is allowed to have a heritage
except for White people’ and that there was a lack of parity in how grievances of
Whites and Blacks were being handled. These complaints existed alongside racist
tropes premised on explicit ideas of social hierarchy and order, like the idea that ‘we
brought them to England to work, but now they are getting ahead’.57 Removing stat-
ues risks playing into racist narratives. A key aim of transitional justice is to prevent
continued violations, and this depends on overturning racist ways of thinking. There
can be a delicate line between acquiescing to racism and acting intelligently to avoid
increasing it, but if removing statues fuels a racist turn in politics, then the strategy
may be in tension with aims of transitional justice. On the other hand, if racist statues
constitute a form of hate speech, then removing them may communicate a society’s
commitment to antiracist values, and counter racist attitudes present in the commu-
nity.58 In the right moment, removing statues and place-names can be significant
moments in a community’s movement towards justice.
Recontextualization
The most commonly discussed alternative to removing statues and problematic place-
names is to recontextualize them.59 Recontextualizing refers to any strategy that
retains the statue or place-name but adds to it or alters its context and thus changes
its meaning. The category of recontextualization is often discussed generically, but it
encompasses an extremely wide range of actions. Recontextualizing is too heteroge-
neous to be evaluated as a unified strategy. Instead, the question is what forms of
recontextualization are best and whether the best politically achievable forms are con-
sistent with transitional justice.
Valuable instances of recontextualizing have been demonstrated in many locales.60
In Bristol, Colston’s empty plinth has become a site of ongoing interventions, making
it a collective, dynamic work of memorial art in itself.61 In previous years, artists
‘white-faced’ Colston’s statue, added unauthorized heritage plaques, and attached a
red-yarn ball and chain to Colston’s ankles.62 Bristolian Tim Goldsworthy proposed
adding a ‘LOVE’ sculpture between the statue and the war memorial, and poet Ros
Martin proposed adding an engraved poem by one of Bristol’s Black poet laureates.63
An indirect counter to the Colston controversies in 2018 was the erection, some
streets away, of a guerrilla sculpture of ‘Rebel Ruth’, a feisty older woman holding a
handbag and a hammer. And some have suggested steps halfway between removing
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and recontextualizing, such as melting Colston’s statue and weaving the molten statue
into a slavery memorial.64
There are a number of ways in which successful recontextualizing can support tran-
sitional justice. First, recontextualizing may express a readiness to hold human rights
violators accountable, in part by keeping them in the public eye while acknowledging
their role in serious injustices. For instance, Nathaniel Adam Tobias Coleman has
suggested that accountability would be served by keeping Colston’s statue in public
space but off his pedestal to be met eye to eye, as equal citizens.65
Second, defenders of recontextualizing hold that it supports rights to truth. Remov-
ing statues, they argue, will lessen street-level familiarity with historical figures. In
Bristol, far more people are familiar with Colston than with other Bristolians who
played equally significant roles in slavery, suggesting that there are pedagogical func-
tions served by keeping these figures in the landscape and ‘enlivening’ them in one
way or another.
Third, defenders hold that recontextualizing meets responsibilities of symbolic repair
by changing a statue’s meaning, from honouring to reflection. Fourth, the best forms
of recontextualizing can help meet rights to guarantees against future rights violations,
if they help people learn about history and become motivated to fight ongoing injus-
tices.
However, there are also important counterarguments. Recontextualizating will only
support transitional justice if it is dramatic and prominent, sending clear messages of
justice, acknowledgement, repair, and guarantees of protection. Critics often argue for
removing statues instead because they believe that no politically realistic recontextual-
izing will adequately change the meaning of contested objects. The scale and form of
statues can make them difficult to resignify. A plaque is inevitably much smaller than
a statue. A viewer will see the statue first, and amongst its abiding impressions will be
its scale and posture, often a stance of pride and authority. Only a small number of
viewers will read a plaque, and a plaque will not communicate as directly, deeply, or
subliminally as a strong human form. Moreover, historical plaques have markedly dif-
ferent implications depending on wording and content. In practice, it can be difficult
to gain public approval for forthrightly critical wording, and judgements about what
counts as a ‘balanced’ historical statement vary depending on political outlook. There
is a risk that minimal plaques are not truly aimed at symbolic repair but are instead
designed to protect statues from removal and diffuse critique.66 Thus there is a risk
that a recontextualized statue will still assert the power of the figure presented.
Advocates of removal argue that civic landscapes have been shaped by elites with
vested interests, often without popular approval or input. Why should a handful of his-
toric elites set a status quo in perpetuity? Removal allows major reconfiguration of
public space. By contrast, recontextualizing means that public space must always
answer a racist argument that should never have been made in the first place.
A common alternative is to move statues to museums, to be presented as artefacts
rather than current state speech. However, museums are controlled spaces with a
more limited audience than street art, and they are a barrier to more guerrilla forms of
intervention. As Mark Auslander writes, ‘I am troubled by the implied assumption
that museums are technologies of deconsecration and will somehow neutralize the
aura of Confederate iconography, rending them benign objects of a detached historical
gaze’.67
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A pivotal concern for recontextualizing has to do with who controls the process.
Principle 6 of the UN guidance on transitional justice states: ‘Ensure the centrality of
victims in the design and implementation of transitional justice processes and mecha-
nisms’ (p. 2). Although the direct victims of Atlantic world slavery are dead, slavery
and postslavery racism have profound legacies of harm today.68 If measures are taken
without leadership from Black communities, there is likely to be a sense that measures
have been co-opted, giving little sense of ownership and symbolic repair. Moreover,
measures need leadership from a wide range of Black voices, and not only from a few
prominent figures.
Furthermore, recontextualizing depends upon the success of its symbolism. Often,
symbolic choices will read in different ways to different viewers, and managing these
meanings can be particularly difficult when a problematic figure is left in place. A
competition held by Historic England in 2018 exemplifies the challenge. The competi-
tion invited contestants to find new ways of publicly remembering events, people, and
identities.69 A winning entry by MSMR architects focused on the Colston statue in
Bristol. The entry left Colston on his pedestal but created a scooped space around
him in the shape of an enslaving ship, with bodies outlined in the style of the Brooks
Ship. An artist’s rendition depicts visitors walking across the ship, looking towards
Colston at its helm.70
Many visitors would certainly find this intervention expressively powerful.71 How-
ever, for others the symbolism would be problematic. Colston’s figure is lifelike,
whereas the unnamed African figures are depicted in outline, with individuality
marked only through nonhuman materials like stone or metal. They are passive, with-
out agency. Allowing passers-by to walk across the enslaved figures, as depicted in the
artist’s rendition, could be seen as insulting rather than generating respect. Colston’s
prominence gives an impression of individual rather than collective responsibility for
the injustices of slavery. By placing Colston in an elevated position over captive bod-
ies, the design risks reinforcing negative imagery, without priming visitors to imagine a
future of justice and equality. Even if the intervention was powerful and positive for
many visitors, these complexities make it unclear to what extent it would support tran-
sitional aims of reconciliation and repair.
The purpose of highlighting this example is certainly not to criticize the artists but
to illustrate how difficult it can be to recontextualize effectively – a point also illus-
trated by controversies over the guerrilla statue of BLM protester Jen Reid, in the
weeks following Colston’s fall. It is difficult to anticipate how recontextualized symbols
will ‘read’ to different viewers. In many contexts, city planners and heritage bodies are
predominantly white, and gaps in racialized experience may add to difficulty assessing
appropriate symbolism for designs they are considering. This highlights the risk that
efforts to recontextualize may in practice be shaped by voices with sincere good inten-
tion, but who may struggle to manage the symbolism in question, in part through lack
of access to situated perspectives, and in part because of physical properties of the
original object.
Above, I have outlined some ways in which recontextualizing may or may not be
effective in changing the meaning of a statue. These suggest that recontextualizing can
indeed support transitional justice, but also highlight the need for realism. Many forms
of recontextualization that are politically viable will gain easy public agreement pre-
cisely because they do not really change the significance of the objects in question.
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Measures that are more dramatic may be just as polarizing and in some cases just as
offensive to opponents as removal. This highlights that whether recontextualizing sup-
ports transitional justice will depend on particulars. Good, long-term recontextualiza-
tions will require outstanding judgement.
A modest and accessible starting point is for communities to gain experience by
allowing guerrilla art interventions to remain for extended periods, as Bristol has his-
torically done.72 A more active approach might involve a city-sponsored, rotating pro-
gramme of interventions, such as commissioned art installations, linked with
educational programming. Finally, it is sometimes more politically viable to achieve
recontextualization at a distance, by adding other layers to the wider landscape. For
instance, the Equal Justice Initiative has added historical plaques to lynching and slav-
ery-related sites across the South.73 Together with the Peace and Justice Memorial,
this programme has had a profound effect on historical awareness and public attitudes.
The EJI exemplifies how major plaques and memorials can significantly transform a
public landscape, in the process acting as counter-monuments to Confederate statues.
Reclaiming
In this final section, I highlight the value of ‘reclaiming’ as part of our responses to
contested heritage. Reclaiming refers to any strategy that adopts a previously pejorative
symbol and resignifies it to create a new symbol of pride and affirmation, in a way that
empowers a previously disempowered group. Reclaiming involves symbolic reconfigu-
rations. It takes metaphors, meanings, and associations that previously seemed rigid,
fixed, and negative and recombines them to generate new meanings.
Reclaiming need not keep original objects in place. Instead, it can be combined with
preserving, removing, or recontextualizing. For instance, where a statue of Nelson or
Columbus has been removed, a Caribbean community might hold teach-ins about
African-Caribbean history. This reclaims the location and marks it as a site of mem-
ory. Many recontextualizations are also instances of reclaiming. Recontextualizing Col-
ston with a poem by a Black Bristolian poet reclaims the site as a space by and for
persons of African descent. Finally, reclaiming can be an empowering response to
preservationism. Bristol University students launched a major conversation on cam-
pus, when they called for renaming Wills Memorial Building.74 When the university
refused to rename, philosopher Nathaniel Adam Tobias Coleman inaugurated a prac-
tice of hosting decolonial public events in the Old Council Chambers of Wills Memo-
rial Building, demonstrating a simple way to reclaim a preserved site.
Reclaiming has many advantages from the perspective of transitional justice.
Reclaiming gives communities options for grassroots-led symbolic repair even in con-
texts where institutions are resistant. Another advantage of reclaiming is that it puts
previously disadvantaged groups into a psychological position of self-determination
and self-recognition.75 Reclaiming supports rights to justice because it can be a way
for persons harmed by injustice to assert status and hold institutions accountable.
Reclaiming can ‘flip the narrative’, directing attention towards agency and stories of
persons previously marginalized. Reclaiming also supports the right to truth and
acknowledgement. Part of the false message conveyed by racist statues is the idea that
the community’s central story and heritage is that of the figures depicted. Reclaiming
shifts attention towards the agency, heritage, and creativity of people who have
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overcome these injustices, thus helping to generate a different image of the society. In
the same way, reclaiming helps to achieve symbolic repair. It asserts, and then vivifies
through art, poetry, or other media, that the meaning of certain objects and locations
will no longer be a degrading one. Such resignification can potentially happen at a
profound level. Anndeloris Chacon, poet and director of the Bristol Black Carers Net-
work, has said that as a Trinidadian, when she thinks of slavery she thinks of Emanci-
pation Day, and is filled with pride at the ingenuity, determination, and creativity of
people who had nothing and created something.76 This demonstrates a kind of con-
ceptual reclaiming, facilitated through pride-generating social practices, like Trinidad’s
Emancipation Day celebrations. Finally, reclaiming supports guarantees of nonrecur-
rence, through self-empowerment, demonstrating the community’s resilience and
readiness to pursue justice and equality.
One might even hypothesize that reclaiming is a necessary condition of successful
responses to contested heritage. This thought arises from two principles. First, as the
Yale Guidelines on Renaming rightly state, there is a responsibility to ensure that
responses to contested heritage do not obscure history. Second, measures that do pre-
serve memory, but without empowering descendant communities, fail to meet the
sixth principle from the UN guidelines. And measures that do both empower commu-
nities and preserve history inherently include an element of reclaiming. At the very
least, they may reclaim a location, creating a site of memory, or they may reconfigure
other aspects of an artefact’s symbolism. Thus reclaiming might be a necessary ele-
ment of successful responses to contested heritage.
However, reclaiming is not sufficient for transitional justice. Paradigmatic instances
of reclaiming are ones enacted by persons of a previously disempowered group. How-
ever, it is not enough for groups to affirm their own standing. It is necessary for a
wider society to also affirm this standing and demonstrate a commitment to justice,
truth, repair, and equal protection. Institutions and wider culture must express and
follow through on commitments to these rights. However, these wider social efforts at
repair must not dominate a descendant community’s own ability to shape responses.
Conclusion
This article breaks new ground by using principles from transitional justice to system-
atically analyse four strategies for responding to contested heritage: preserving, remov-
ing, recontextualizing, and reclaiming. I have argued that successful measures are ones
that help a diverse public integrate messages of justice, truth, repair, and guarantees of
nonrecurrence, as well as wider messages of equality, connection, peace, and reconcili-
ation.
I have drawn on numerous examples to illustrate the argument, uniquely collating
both positive and negative examples from Bristol, one of the most important British
contestations to date. These examples are likely to be of wide interest, giving models
that decision-makers in other contexts can follow and highlighting pitfalls to avoid.
A core argument of this article is that many different strategies can be consistent
with transitional justice. Macro strategies do matter; a bold institutional decision can
lead to a cascade of related activity, as in the case of more than 20 Bristol institutions
who followed Colston Hall in taking some action to acknowledge their history or
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address colonial iconography. As important as the choice of strategy, however, is how
it is enacted.
I have addressed what kinds of ideals we might aim for, in relation to any given
strategy, in order for that path to be consistent with transitional justice. When we
choose to preserve morally complex heritage, we inherit a particular responsibility to
ensure that doing so does not have an apologist effect. It is easy for preservation to
result in downplaying the seriousness of the injustice. It can also have the effect of
reinforcing both overt and subtle racist attitudes. Preserving works best when there are
active structures of both formal and informal education that incorporate these objects
as points for reflection and pedagogy.
In the case of removals, I emphasized that these can and should be historic
moments in a community, marking a turning point in how the community addresses
its history. Any discussion of removal attracts intense scrutiny, which can provide an
opportunity to improve public understanding of the history and its relevance today
and to affirm collective commitments to human rights and equality. However, any
institutions considering removal should be aware that it will frequently be seen as an
attempt to escape an uncomfortable history, rather than to confront it. This strategy
depends on outstanding leadership and public communication.
Recontextualization is often seen as a positive compromise between removal and
preservation (Schulz 2018). In practice, it can again take exceptional leadership and
judgement to achieve meaningful, permanent, official recontextualizations. Interven-
tions that are politically viable are often not bold enough to really change the meaning
of a statue or other object. Those that are bold are often as offensive and distressing
to critics as removal. In rapidly changing cultural environments, such interventions
may quickly seem out of date, and in diverse environments they may ‘read’ very differ-
ently to different parts of the community. An easily implemented approach is to allow
guerrilla art interventions to remain in place for a period of months or to actively coor-
dinate a cycle of interventions, for instance via artists working with schools. Neverthe-
less, these interventions take ongoing effort and work and often raise controversy.
Ultimately, permanent art and memorials directly honouring victims of the injustice
on their own terms are important for helping to ‘hold’ the history and convey collec-
tive acknowledgment and repudiation of injustices that have historically been denied.
Finally, many successful responses to contested heritage involve some form of
reclaiming. Reclaiming involves resignifying artefacts (or locations of former artefacts)
in a way that transforms their symbolic meanings and empowers a formerly marginal-
ized group. Reclaiming is one key element of symbolic repair and transitional justice
in communities with historic entanglements with colonialism and white supremacy.
Joanna Burch-Brown, University of Bristol, Bristol, U.K. jb12159@bristol.ac.uk
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